Abstract. In games with costless preplay communication, some strategies are more complex than others in the sense that they induce a ®ner partition of the set of states of the world. This paper shows that if the concept of evolutionary stability, which is argued to be a natural solution concept for communication games, is modi®ed to take lexicographic complexity preferences into account, then for a class of games of common interest only communication strategies that induce payo¨-dominant Nash outcomes of the underlying game are stable.
Introduction
Much of economic theory deals with coordination problems. Perhaps the most basic is the exploitation of potential gains from trade. In game-theoretic terms, this is the problem of coordinating on a payo¨-dominant equilibrium out of a larger set of equilibria. If the players of a game are allowed to communicate in a language before taking actions, we have a strong intuition that they will achieve coordination. The sub®eld of cooperative game theory is partly based on this intuition. In this paper we shall argue that if complexity is costly, then evolutionary processes will indeed select for languages that allow such coordination.
For a long time it seems to have been taken more or less for granted that explicit modeling of communication opportunities would support the intuition as a formal result in a straightforward manner. As it turns out, there are complications. The only immediate e¨ect of adding a preplay communication stage where costless, e.g., verbal, messages can be sent to a one-shot game is an expansion of the set of equilibrium outcomes to include correlated equilibrium payo¨s [see, e.g., Wa Èrneryd (1992) ].
Some authors [notably Farrell (1987 [notably Farrell ( , 1993 and Rabin (1990) ] have dealt with this by assuming the messages have established meanings in some language held in common by the players. If the players adhere to such meanings when there are no positive incentives not to, a re®nement of the set of equilibria may be the result. In most applications, this approach seems eminently natural. When it comes to explaining why communication works, however, it is unsatisfactory. It amounts to assuming what is to be proved, namely that communication allows the players to coordinate. The``semantic'' approach leaves open the question of where those meanings come from in the ®rst place.
A di¨erent approach sees meaning as an equilibrium property of messages at stationary states of some evolutionary or trial-and-error process. This line of thinking was intuitively suggested in the early work of Crawford and Sobel (1982) , and is formally developed in, e.g., Banerjee and Weibull (1993) , Bhaskar (1998), Kim and Sobel (1995) , Matsui (1991) , Schlag (1993) , and Wa Èrneryd (1991, 1993) . These contributions argue that in a class of games of common interest the only stable equilibria are those that induce e½cient outcomes. These results utilize a mechanism that Robson (1990) has called the``secret handshake.'' The idea is that if a society of players is stuck in an ine½cient equilibrium, then mutants could arise that behave according to the dominating standard when they meet the old type of players, but use a message not distinguished by the old type of players to coordinate on e½cient behavior when they meet each other. Such mutants would do better than the incumbent population and slowly drive the old convention out of existence.
The secret handshake construction relies on the availability of messages not used by the incumbent population in the ine½cient equilibrium. Hence it cannot work when there are no unused messages. But if there are no unused messages at an ine½cient convention, then clearly some messages are wasted for no good purpose. The strategies used are unnecessarily complex, in the sense that they distinguish certain messages only in order to uphold ine½cient play. In this paper, we shall argue that if complexity is costly, then there must always be unused messages that can be used to destabilize ine½cient equilibria.
We apply the idea of lexicographic complexity preferences in the spirit of Binmore and Samuelson (1992) . There is a natural complexity measure for`l anguages'' in the sense of these models. A language is more complex the more ®nely it distinguishes between di¨erent possible messages, i.e., the more nuances it has. The intuition behind the results in this paper is that if such complexity is costly, it can only be used to coordinate on e½cient solutions. Anderlini (1990) also discusses complexity issues in the context of communication in coordination games, but from the standpoint of perturbations of a priori restricted sets of strategies.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the general model. The concept of evolutionary stability is de®ned in Section 3, which also dis-
